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1. Introduction 
The point of departure for this paper is the universal commitment to fundamental 
human values expressed in our own time as human rights. In the aftermath of the 
Second World War the nations of the world determined that flagrant abuses of 
human rights would never be tolerated again, and that nation states must have 
regard to fundamental human rights in the enunciation of public policy. 
Notwithstanding that determination, abuses of human rights go on and, in the 
case ofbioethics, are commonly promoted. One such area is euthanasia. It will be 
argued in this paper that the State cannot allow or tolerate euthansia because it 
violates international law, and constitutes a threat to the social contract whereby 
the ruler is bound to secure the right to life of the citizenry. 
2. Human Rights 
2.1 The Right to Life 
In any discussion on human rights, full account has to be taken of the 
provisions of the U.N. Charter, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
which seeks to specify Article 55 of the U.N. Charter. Article 55 commits the 
United Nations to "promote respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or 
religion."l 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is founded upon the notion that 
there are human values and that these values are inherent in the human 
individual. In the Preamble the Declaration states that "the foundation of 
freedom, justice and peace in the world" is the "recognition of the inherent 
dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human 
family". 
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As far as the Declaration is concerned there are human values inherent in all 
members of the human family because of their "inherent dignity". Since 
"dignity" is about true worth or excellence ["dignus" L. means worthy], and, in 
the context, human worth, then the claim for the dignity of human beings is a 
claim for basic human values. 
Further, the Preamble links human dignity, human values with human rights 
which are described as "inalienable rights", rights of which we may not be 
deprived and cannot deprive ourselves. I must not be sold into slavery and I am to 
be restrained from selling myself into slavery. 
These human rights which reflect human values must, says the Preamble, "be 
protected by the rule of law" otherwise humankind may be driven, "as a last 
resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression". This protection of the rule of 
law is necessary not only for human beings to live together peaceably within the 
State, but also so that nations may live together in peace. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights presents itself to the world as "a 
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations" and as a guide 
for every structure in society and for every individual in order that the rights 
identified in the Declaration may have "their universal and effective recognition 
and observance" secured. 
In Article 1 the Declaration asserts certain things about human beings which 
affect the understanding of the rest of the document. Human beings, it says, "are 
born free and equal in dignity and rights". This value of equality of human beings, 
this injunction not to show preference between individuals in the recognition of 
"the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration" is further specified in 
Article 2. In particular, in the entitlement to the rights and freedoms in the 
Declaration there is to be no distinction of any kind, "such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or other status." 
In this way the Declaration excludes discrimination against the elderly and the 
very young, the physically and mentally disabled and the chronically ill. All have 
equal claim to the rights and freedoms enunciated in the Declaration. 
In Article 3 the Declaration begins the articulation of the human values to be 
defended in terms of human rights. "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the 
security of person." Thus is human life held to be both inviolable and inalienable. 
The Declaration does not begin with hard cases or exceptions, but with the 
general proposition which concerns the value of human life. It is also interesting 
to note the order of the rights articulated - life first, then freedom [liberty], and 
then security of person. Unless the right to life can be guaranteed by the State then 
there is no meaningful right to freedom or to security of person. The right to life is 
logically prior to considerations of the quality of the individual's life. 
2.2 Human Rights and International Law 
The member nations of the United Nations are committed to the promotion of 
"universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion"2 by way 
of a pledge. 
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All members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the 
Organisation for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55,3 
What we have here is the idea of a consensus gentium, an agreement among 
the nations, a consent to be bound by certain values expressed as human rights. 
This doctrine of consent involves the idea that the "basis of obligation of all 
international law, and not merely of treaties, is the consent of States."4 
Legal positivism, the dominant theory of the early part of the twentieth 
century, "combined with a strict application of the doctrine of national 
sovereignty, , , effectively excluded the possibility of judging, and therefore 
criticizing, the treatment of any people by its own government." Paul Sieghart 
has observed that the apotheosis and consequent downfall of that position "came 
in National Socialist Germany" when that regime perpetrated "historically 
unprecendented atrocities". 
According to the strict doctrine of national sovereignty, any foreign criticism of those 
laws was therefore formally illegitimate; according to the strict positivist position, it was 
also meaningless, And precisely the same position could be, and was, taken in relation to 
the atrocities perpetrated at much the same time upon some millions of its citizens by the 
regime then legitimately in power in the USSR,S 
As far as the ius gentium is concerned, Bruno Simma and Philip Alston 
understand human rights in terms of internationalla w by "treating the Universal 
Declaration and the body of soft law built upon it as an authoritative 
interpretation of the obligation contained in Articles 55 and 56 of the U,N. 
Charter."6 In these articles the members of the United Nations "pledge 
themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the 
Organization" in order to achieve "universal respect for, and observance of, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language or religion". Importantly, they also refer to Article 38 of the Statute of 
the International Court which gives as a basis for unwritten international law 
"the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations",? Both of these 
ways of grounding "substantive obligations to respect human rights in positive 
international law" are commended by Simma and Alston as "more acceptable 
under the premises of consensual internationallaw-making."8 
Who, then, is bound by the ius gentium? N.A. Maryan Green holds, in 
company with many others, that the subjects of international law are (1) states, 
(2) international organisations, (3) certain special entities such as the Vatican, (4) 
special individuals such as diplomats, aliens, refugees, slaves, minorities, and (5) 
persons, corporations and governments with respect to human rights,9 
Individuals are bound by the ius gentium in so far as human rights are at issue. 1o 
In his discussion of the development of international law D. J, Harris observes 
that the "demise of Oppenheim's doctrine that 'States solely and exclusively are 
the subject ofInternational Law' is also evident . .. it is . , , the case that inter-state 
treaties are increasingly concerned with the 'trans-national' affairs . . . of private 
individuals and companies."ll Harris, in a later discussion of the activities of the 
UN Commission on Human Rights, draws attention to the fact that "the idea that 
the treatment of a state's own nationals is a matter within its own jurisdiction has 
46 Linacre Quarterly 
been abandoned." 
The practice of the Commission shows clearly the acceptance by states, as they respond 
without question to allegations against them, that the protection of human rights is now 
within the domain of international law. 12 [my emphasis] 
One may take the view, following John Humphrey or Oscar Schachter that, 
because of a consensus gentium relating to the actual behaviour of nations, the 
Universal Declaration has become part of the customary la w of nations. Or, one 
may accept the alternative views ofSimma and Alston, put slightly differently by 
Ivan Shearer, that the consensus gentium refers to 
a widespread conviction that certain principles of conduct are binding in law - or at least 
in morality - without the necessity of applying the usual proofs of customary law; indeed, 
that even widespread evidence of non-observance of these norms will not invalidate 
them. It is in this way, for example, that one would argue that genocide and torture are 
contrary to international law. 13 
The consensus gentium on human rights has now gathered the force of . 
international law, despite the fact that "there are no legally binding sanctions 
available."14 
The Universal Declaration is, then, something which is morally and legally 
binding in the sense that member states assent to it by virtue of their membership 
of the United Nations arid in the sense that it embodies human values expressed as 
human rights on which civilised people are agreed. And by the end of 1998 there 
were 159 member states of the United Nations representing a total estimated 
population of 5,040,770,000.15 The world popUlation in 1988 was estimated to 
be 5,130 million. 16 This means that about 97% of the world belonged to nations 
that were member states of the United Nations and were thereby committed to 
the U.N. Charter and to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Indeed, 
even those states which are not members of the United Nations are bound to 
observe human rights because human rights now form part of the ius gentium 
The evidence, then, for a consensus gentium on human values is evident not 
just in terms of the current overwhelming human agreement on human rights, but 
also in terms of the consistent support for these values throughout human history 
in every culture. That governments and individuals have not always behaved 
consistently with those values is obvious. But the human agreement on human 
values represents the opportunity to adjust practice to principle. 
2.3 Human Rights and Inalienability 
As I have already observed, fundamental rights are inalienable as well as 
inviolable. These are rights of which I may not be deprived and of which I may 
not deprive myself. To deprive myself ofthese rights threatens the rights of others. 
Thus the State cannot allow the slave trade even if individuals for very 
compassionate reasons decide, quite voluntarily, to sell themselves into the slave 
trade. I? 
Contemporary human rights discourse has, as its origin, 18 the modern doctrine 
of natural law inaugurated by Thomas Hobbes riding on the back of 
Machiavelli's realism about the way human beings actually behave. Hobbes, like 
Machiavelli before him, rejected the Aristotelianism of the School men as 
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building castles in the air. But Machiavelli's substitution of political virtue for moral 
virtue created difficulties as did his admiration for "the lupine policies of republican 
Rome". Hobbes attempted to restore the moral principles of politics, the natural 
law, "on the plane of Machiavelli's 'realism."'19 
Human beings, said Hobbes, act in a self-interested manner and are inclined to "a 
perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death."20 
Traditional philosophy had failed to deal with scepticism. Hobbes believed that the 
only way to come to terms with the truth contained in a scepticism which persisted 
despite all attempts by dogmatism to overcome it, was to give full range to 
scepticism. Whatever "survives the onslaught of extreme scepticism is the 
absolutely safe basis of wisdom."21 The only fact about human existence that 
survived the full blast of scepticism was the impulse to self-preservation.22 From this 
fact Hobbes deduced the natural right to live, the right of individuals to use their 
own power for their self-preservation. The law of nature 
... is a precept or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that, 
which is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same; and to omit 
that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved.23 
Thus the notion of inalienability finds its origins as far as modem human rights 
discourse is concerned in the modem doctrine of natural law as proposed by 
Hobbes. In its fullest formulation it is a recognition that the right to life is as 
fundamental to the social contract as the right to liberty, and that any exceptions to 
the laws against the intentional killing of the innocent, even when a competent adult 
asks for it, threatens the right to life of other citizens. Just as the State cannot 
condone a citizen alienating his or her right to freedom because this would 
legitimate the slave trade into which others far less willingly would be drawn, so the 
State cannot license any citizens to kill other innocent citizens, even at their own 
request, because this would lead to the killings of others who did not ask to be killed. 
Is there any empirical evidence to suggest the truth or otherwise of Hobbes's 
philosophical insight? There is. It may be found in the practise of euthanasia in The 
Netherlands, and in a recent survey of the practice of physicians and nurses in the 
State of South Australia. 
3. The Evidence 
3.1 The Netherlands 
The recently published Remmelink reports contain overwhelming evidence that, 
in a country in which voluntary euthanasia is legally tolerated, at least as many if not 
more patients are killed without their knowledge and consent by the medical 
profession. 
The Lancet Dutch Report indicates that about 0.8% of the 38.0% of all deaths 
involving MDEL were "life-terminating acts without explicit and persistent 
request".24 The need for the request to come from the patient, for it to be 
well-considered, durable and persistent, as well as a free and voluntary request 
forms part of the strict medical guidelines laid down by the Dutch courts and 
summarised by Mrs. Borst-Eilers, Vice-President of the Dutch Health Council.25 
This means that The Lancet Dutch Report acknowledges the deaths of about 1,000 
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Dutch citizens in a single year which were the result of the doctor hastening the 
death of the patient, without the patient's explicit request and consent. The Lancet 
Dutch Report summarises it in this way: 
Sometimes the death of a patient was hastened without his or her explicit and persistent 
request. These patients were close to death and were suffering grievously. In more than 
half such cases the decision had been discussed with the patient or the patient had 
previously stated that he would want such a way of proceeding under certain 
circumstances. Also, when the decision was not discussed with the patients, almost aU of 
them were incompetent.26 
In the light of the fact that Dutch doctors do not always tell the truth in these 
matters27, that some 1,000 patients are killed outside of the 'strict medical 
guidelines', the lack of concern by the authors of the The Lancet Dutch Report is 
noteworthy. Ten Have and Welie have suggested that the Remmelink 
Committee's interpretation of the facts "reveals a political bias". 
The committee clearly tried to remove any societal anxieties about the practice of 
euthanasia. Similar practices are brought under dissimilar headings to keep the numbers 
low. And at crucial places, particularly with the l,OOO non-voluntary cases, the committee 
uses fallacious rhetoric to emphasize that there is nothing to worry about. 28 
There are two other matters which also give cause for concern. 
Firstly, the definition of euthanasia used in the report is a very narrow one: 
"active termination of life upon the patient's request". This definition does not 
include those who die of non-voluntary euthanasia, and so does not include the 
1,000 patients to which I have already referred. Nor does it refer to those whose 
death is intentionally brought about by 'omission', by either withdrawing 
treatment or refusing to initiate treatment. As John Keown recently pointed out: 
"If a doctor's intent is to kill his patient, it morally matters not whether he does so 
by (say) giving him poisoned food or by starving him."29 Far from understanding 
that the matter of intention is fundamental both in law and morals to an 
understanding of the blameworthiness of a person's act or omission, the authors of 
the Remmelink Report go so far as to suggest, somewhat petulantly, that both the 
present writer and Brian Pollard "must have missed at least two decades of ethical 
debate" because each of us included under the general rubric of "euthanasia" 
(voluntary, non-voluntary, and involuntary) the 5,800 cases30 of non-treatment 
decisions "in which the patient explicitly requested to withhold or withdraw a 
treatment."31 What van Delden, et ai, do not say is that each of us included those 
cases precisely because they were done either with an explicit or implicit intention 
to accelerate the end of life. 
Without an understanding of intention it is almost impossible to distinguish, 
morally and legally, theft from borrowing, theft from a prank, murder from 
accidental killing. Two acts which look the same such as stealing a pencil from 
another person and borrowing a pencil may be distinguished by intention. Theft 
involves an intention to permanently deprive. Having no articulated moral theory 
upon which to proceed, and having no doctrine of intention to help sort out 
morally acceptable acts or omissions from morally unacceptable acts or omissions, 
van Delden, et ai, then suggest that if Fleming and Pollard want to be consistent 
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"they would have to accept any NTD (non-treatment decision), even those to 
which the patient is opposed, as long as the doctor does not think about hastening 
the end of life of the patient."32 Well, the doctor can think anything he likes 
including thinking about Mozart. That is not morally relevant. What is morally 
relevant is whether in removing or not starting treatment he intends to kill his 
patient, or whether his non-treatment decision is based upon his best clinical 
judgement that that treatment would either be futile or burdensome 
disproportionate to benefit. In cases where it is the patient who wishes no further 
treatment then, at least in Australian law, the doctor cannot proceed to treat. This is 
true even when such a refusal is thought to be suicidal. Even here in many 
jurisdictions in the world there is legal room for a doctor or private citizen to 'rescue' 
someone about to commit suicide. And since in many instances the call to be killed 
reflects a patient in physical pain or suffering from depression, there is ample room 
for the depression or physical pain to be treated bringing forth a different attitude in 
the patient. 
This is not to suggest a "treat at all costs" mentality, or a domination of the 
physician over the patient. Far from it. It is to suggest that treatment can be foregone 
or discontinued in a morally sound way when such a refusal carries with it no 
intention to kill. One may foresee that one's death is near. One may even welcome 
one's own death. That, however, is not the same thing as wanting to be killed. And if 
a doctor believes that the patient's lawful refusal of treatment is in fact suicidal, and 
he does not want in any way to cooperate with suicidal omissions, he may retire 
from the case and allow another physician to be appointed. 
Moreover, van Delden, et aI, simply confuse motive with intention. 
No physician who performs euthanasia does so with the sole intent to kill his or her patient. 
His or her intention can always be described as trying to relieve the sufferings of his or her 
patient. This is exactly what infuriates Dutch physicians when, after reporting the case they 
are treated as criminals and murderers.33 
They appear not to understand that the doctor's motive in killing the patient to 
relieve pain may be a very understandable and laudable motive. It doesn't change 
the fact that, motivated by a desire to relieve the patient's suffering, the particular act 
or omission chosen is chosen because the doctor intends to kill the patient and is 
therefore committing a homicide. Since the Remmelink Report provides evidence 
that in over 10,558 cases it had been the doctor's explicit intention to shorten life, 
then not surprisingly many people do evaluate what has happened as murder even if 
such an evaluation infuriates those who commit the murders. 
If reference is then made to the two Dutch reports upon which The Lancet Dutch 
Report is based, then a very disturbing picture emerges. The number of physician 
assisted deaths estimated by the Remmelink Committee Report34 is 25,306, all of 
which involve intentional (sometimes implicit, sometimes explicit) killing by act or 
by neglect, some voluntary and others non-voluntary. They are made up of: 
50 
2,300 euthanasia on request35 
400 assisted suicide36 
1,000 life-ending treatment without explicit request3? 
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4,756 patients died after request for non-treatment or the cessation of 
treatment with the intention to accelerate the end of life38 
8,750 cases in which life-prolonging treatment was withdrawn or withheld 
without the request of the patient either with the implicit intention (4,750) or 
with the explicit intention (4,000) to terminate life39 
8,100 cases of morphine overdose with the implicit intention (6,750) or with 
the explicit intention (1,350) to terminate life.40 Of these 61 % were carried out 
without consultation with the patient, i.e. non-voluntary euthanasia.41 
This total of 25,306 deaths amounted to 19.61 per cent of total deaths 
[129,000] in The Netherlands in 1990. A large proportion of them involve 
intentional (either implicitly or explicitly) killing by act or by neglect, i.e., 
euthanasia. 
To this should be added the unspecified numbers of handicapped newborns, 
sick children, psychiatric patients, and patients with AIDS, whose lives were 
terminated by physicians, according to the Remme/ink Report. 42 The narrow 
definition of euthanasia masks the real number of individuals whose lives are 
ended by interventions from the medical profession, and also masks the fact that 
more people are killed by physicians without their consent than with their 
consent.43 
This situation is clear if we take only those cases from the Dutch evidence 
where the doctors were "acting with the explicit purpose of hastening the end of 
life."44 This explicit intention or purpose is explained as follows: "If a physician 
administers a drug, withdraws a treatment or withholds one with the explicit 
purpose of hastening the end of life, then the intended outcome of that action is 
the end of the life of the patient."45 
In short, 'explicit' intent is synonymous with the natural (and legal) meaning of 'intent', 
as purpose, goal or aim.46 
Now the Dutch evidence shows us that in 1990 there were 10,558 cases where 
there was an "explicit" intention to hasten the end oflife by act or by omission. As 
John Keown has put it: 
This total compromises the 2,300 cases classified as 'euthanasia' in the survey; the 400 
cases classified as 'assisted suicide' in the survey' 1,000 cases of administering drugs 'with 
the explicit purpose of hastening the end oflife' without explicit request; 1,350 cases of 
the administration of opioids 'with the explicit purpose of shortening life'; 4,000 cases of 
withholding or withdrawing treatment, without explicit request, 'with the explicit . 
purpose of shortening life'; and 1,508 cases of withdrawing or withholding treatment on 
explicit request, 'with the explicit purpose of shortening life'.47 
Simple mathematics shows that of the 10,558 cases where there was an 
"explicit" intention to hasten the end of life by act or by omission, 55% were 
non-voluntary. This justifies the conclusion that it is impossible to quarantine 
non-voluntary euthanasia from voluntary euthanasia, that where voluntary 
euthanasia is practised more are killed without their consent than with their 
consent. That voluntary euthanasia inevitably leads to non-voluntary euthanasia 
has now been accepted by the authors of the Remmelink study: 
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But is it not true that once one accepts [voluntary] euthanasia and assisted suicide, the 
principle of universalizability forces one to accept termination of life without explicit 
request, at least in some circumstances, as well? In our view the answer to this question 
must be affirmative.48 (my emphasis) 
Secondly, The Lancet Dutch Report blandly observes: 
Many physicians who had practised euthanasia mentioned that they would be most 
reluctant to do so again, thus refuting the 'slippery slope' argument.49 
This begs the question as to why such physicans "would be most reluctant" to 
practise euthanasia again. Is it that they feel they have done something very 
wrong? Was it, all things considered, an unpleasant experience, and, if so, in what 
way? It further begs the question as to how the "slippery slope argument" is 
refuted. To be "most reluctant" to do so again doesn't mean that one will not do it 
again. And in the light of the actual information in the Dutch Euthanasia Survey 
Report, on which The Lancet Dutch Report is based, there is ample evidence of 
the slipperiest of SIOpeS,50 thereby giving support to Thomas Hobbes' observation 
that to voluntarily agree to be killed threatens the right to life of other members of 
the community as well. The "slippery slope" is between voluntary and non-
voluntary forms of euthanasia. Proponents of euthanasia talk about only wanting 
voluntary euthanasia. The truth is, that once voluntary euthanasia is practised, 
non-voluntary and involuntary forms of euthanasia are bound to follow as Paul 
van der Mass et al have now conceded.51 
The Remmelink Report, in the context of dealing with the nature of medical 
decisions at the end of life,52 does not effectively deal with the questions of 
palliative careS3, patient depression, patient fears, and subtle and not too subtle 
pressure brought to bear on patients to end it all now, rather than to continue 
being a burden on others. The Remmelink Report fails to give reasons why 
patients who were close to death "were suffering grievously",54 and why a 
wealthy country like The Netherlands does not offer patients effective means to 
relieve that suffering. "Good care is not cheap; it is much cheaper to kill 
people."5S 
Alexander Morgan Capron56 attended a meeting at the Institute for Bioethics, 
Maastricht, The Netherlands, in December 1990, which brought together, by 
invitation, 14 experts to examine the practice of euthanasia in The Netherlands. 
Capron considered the two basic requirements for the justification of euthanasia 
in The Netherlands, self-determination and the relief of suffering. 
Proponents of euthanasia began with a "narrow" defmition (limited to voluntary cases) 
as a strategy for winning acceptance of the general practice, which would then tum to the 
second factor, relief of suffering, as its justification in cases in which patients are unable 
to request euthanasiaY [my emphasis] 
Capron went on to cite the evidence of one of the Dutch participants, a 
physician, who "mentioned that in perhaps thirty cases a year, patients' lives were 
ended after they had been placed in a coma through the administration of 
morphia." 
When asked about the apparent discrepancy, she replied that the latter cases were not 
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instances of euthanasia because they weren't voluntary: discussing the plan to end the 
patients' lives would be "rude," she said, particularly as they know they have an 
incurable condition. Comments from several other physicians made clear that this 
practice is neither limited to one particular hospital nor of recent vintage. Nevertheless, a 
number of the Dutch participants were plainly discomfited to find that at least in some 
situations the number of instances of physicians causing death without consent 
overshadowed the number that met the Dutch definition of "euthanasia."s8 
In a recently completed research project carried out in The Netherlands, John 
Keown argues that the "guidelines" for euthanasia in The Netherlands are not 
strict or precisely defined, and that there is no "satisfactory procedure, such as an 
effective independent check on the doctor's decision-making, to ensure that they 
are met".S9 Keown doubts that the requirement that the request for euthanasia be 
"entirely free and voluntary" is met. "Although the K.N.M.G. Guidelines state 
that the request must not be the result of pressure by others, they do not prevent 
the doctor or nurse from either mentioning euthanasia to the patient as an option 
or even strongly recommending it."60 
Having developed his case that the guidelines are not strictly enforced Keown 
goes on to remark that the "overwhelming majority of cases are falsely certified as 
death by natural causes and are never reported and investigated .. . a doctor who 
has acted in breach of the law is no more likely to admit having done so in his 
report than a tax evader is likely to reveal his dishonesty on his tax retum."61 The 
fact that the "vast majority of deaths from euthanasia are illegally and incorrectly 
reported as natural deaths itself casts doubt on the lawfulness of much of the 
euthanasia which is being carried OUt."62 
Brian Pollard makes similar observations to Keown. He also refers to this 
statement by the Advocate General of The Netherlands: "The medical profession 
is in all likelihood the only academically trained group of professionals, who by 
virtue of their profession, are guilty of making false statements in writing with 
great regularity when, after a euthanasia procedure, they make inaccurate death 
declarations which conceal the unnatural death cause."63 
3.2 South Australia 
In a recently published report of a sociological survey of the attitudes and 
practices of medical practitioners and nurses in South Australia64, Christine 
Stevens and Riaz Hassan found that 19% of medical practitioners and nurses had 
ever taken active steps to bring about the death of a patient. 6S Their most striking 
discovery, however, was that 49% of them had ever received a request from a 
patient to take such active steps66. That is, in a jurisdiction in which euthanasia in 
any form is legally prohibited, 19% of the medical profession agreed that they had 
been involved in euthanasia, but half of those 19% had done so without reference 
to the patient. Again, one wonders why proponents of voluntary euthanasia 
imagine that law-breaking doctors will suddenly become law-abiding if 
voluntary euthanasia is legalized. If a group of medical practitioners (a minority) 
will break the law now, it would be naive to imagine that they and others will not 
break a voluntary euthanasia law and kill those they consider ought to have the 
benefit of euthanasia if only they were competent enough to ask for it. 
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Dr. Stevens recently revealed on radio and in private correspondence that at 
the time when she conducted the study she was not in favour of euthanasia as 
some had imagined, nor was she opposed. "I was entirely neutral and impartial in 
my views, neither in favour nor opposed, until completion of the analysis of the 
survey results."67 She formed views opposed to legalized voluntary euthanasia 
because of her finding of views "albeit minority ones, that poor quality of life, 
mental disability and physical handicap should be valid circumstances for active 
euthanasia, whether this was requested or not."68 
Advocates of euthanasia often argue in its favour from the perspective of individual 
rights, autonomy and dignity, but the research demonstrates that these very principles are 
abused by its practice. There is a danger that legislation of active euthanasia, voluntary or 
involuntary, may expand the potential for further abuses. Further, I consider legalisation 
could undermine the value placed on human life, and erode our sense of security. We 
need to ensure that the state continues to protect people.69 
4. Conclusion 
It is not possible to quarantine voluntary euthanasia from non-voluntary 
euthanasia. The belief that the killings of some innocent human beings leads to 
the killings of many others is justified by the evidence. In any case the bioethical 
literature is replete with examples of bioethicists and philosophers who urge the 
decriminalization of not only voluntary euthanasia but also infanticide and other 
acts of non-voluntary killings of certain classes of human beings. The ultimate 
justification for the non-voluntary killings of some human beings is that they are 
not persons. However, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights forbids the 
dividing up of the human family into persons and non-persons (vid Article 6), and 
presents the right to life and certain other rights as inviolable and inalienable. The 
provision of legal euthanasia represents a violation of international law and 
exposes the citizenry in general to an unreasonable risk to their right to life. 
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